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WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH
245 Va. 177, 427 S.E.2d 379 (1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On October 13, 1989, seventeen-year-old Dwayne Allen Wright
saw thirty-three year-old Saba Tekle driving alone in her friend's car.
Deciding to steal it, Wright followed her home. After Tekle had gotten
out of the car, Wright approached her at gunpoint and demanded the car
keys. Tekle dropped the keys on the ground and Wright ordered Tekle
to remove her clothes because he wanted to take her into a wooded area
and have sex with her. Tekle removed her shoes and underwear and then
ran, screaming, towards her apartment. Wright chased her into the
building and shot her twice, then escaped in the car that Tekle had been
driving.
Wright was charged in juvenile and domestic relations district
court, which found at a transfer hearing I that Wright: (1) was not
criminally insane or mentally retarded; (2) was not amenable to treatment
or rehabilitation as ajuvenile through available facilities considering the
nature of the offenses; and (3) the interests of the community required
that Wright be placed under legal restraint or discipline. Wright appealed
the transfer decision to the circuit court on three grounds. First, he argued
that his Eighth Amendment right was violated because Virginia Code
section 16.1-269 does not mandate consideration of defendant's moral
responsibility or psychological maturity, and as a result the system fails
to offer individualized consideration. Second, Wright argued that a
guardian ad litem was not appointed to protect his interests at the transfer
hearing (although he was represented by counsel). Third, the circuit
court failed to address the issue of criminal insanity (although a mental
evaluation was performed by a qualified psychologist). The circuit court
rejected all of defendant's arguments and found that the requirements of
Virginia Code section 16.1-269 had been met.
Wright was tried as an adult. During the guilt phase, Wright was
found guilty of two counts of capital murder, and single counts of
robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery, and attempted
rape.
During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth presented evidence
of other crimes, including convictions of attempted first degree murder
1 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269(A) states that on motion of the
Commonwealth's attorney, the juvenile court shall hold a transfer
hearing for a child who is fifteen years of age or older and who is charged
with an offense that, if committed by an adult, could be punishable by
confinement in a state correctional facility. The juvenile court may then
transfer the child to the appropriate circuit court for trial.
2 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(C) (1990).
3 Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 195,427 S.E.2d 379,393
(1993).
4 The defendant assigned a number of additional errors. Some of
these the court rejected in brief, conclusive language. Others did not
involve death penalty law. On still others, the rulings provide little if any
guidance, because they apply broad, settled principles of law to facts that
are specific to the case being reviewed. Issues in this case that will not
be addressed in this summary include: (1) trial court's refusal to reinstate
venire members dismissed on prosecutor's peremptory strikes, on basis
that the exercise of the peremptory challenge was based upon factors
other than the venire member's race; (2) trial court's refusal to grant
and use of a handgun, and conviction of first degree murder, in addition
to an unadjudicated act of murder on October 9, 1989, to which Wright
confessed. The Commonwealth called as a witness Arthur Centor, a
clinical psychologist, who had examined Wright and found him compe-
tent to stand trial. Dr. Centor also found that Wright had not suffered
from any extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the
offense, and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
and his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
not significantly impaired.2 The Commonwealth's psychologist also
examined Wright to determine any mitigating or aggravating factors.
The psychologist testified that Wright has a "borderline" verbal I.Q. of
76, an average performance I.Q. of 92, and a low-average full-scale I.Q.
of 81. The psychologist testified that he found no evidence of mental
disorders, emotional disturbance or brain damage. Further, he stated that
in his opinion, based on Wright's "social history" and the examination,
that there was a "high probability" that Wright would pose a future
danger to society.
3
Dr. Samenow, a clinical psychologist who had been appointed by
the trial court for the defendant testified that he agreed with the
prosecution's findings regarding intelligence. He testified regarding
Wright's background, but proffered no opinion as to future dangerous-
ness. The jury found that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness
was present and sentenced Wright to death.
HOLDING
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held, inter alia,
4
that there was no Eighth Amendment violation for imposing the death
penalty on a seventeen year-old, that the penalty was not substantively
barred by the Eighth Amendment, and that juvenile defendants were not
entitled to individualized determination of their maturity and moral
culpability beyond that provided to all capital defendants at penalty
trials.5 The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support
ajury finding of future dangerousness, and thus sufficient to support the
imposition of the death penalty.
6
mistrial after juror heard defendant's family members mention "capital
punishment" and "life imprisonment", on basis that the particular juror
was replaced and there was no impermissible effect upon remaining
jurors; (3) trial court's admitting into evidence aphotograph of the blood-
stained door to victim's apartment, on basis that photograph was relevant
to show malice and premeditation; (4) trial court's ruling that evidence
that victim removed her shoes and underpants in response to defendant's
force, threat and intimidation was sufficient to prove attempted rape; (5)
trial court's finding that evidence was sufficient for premeditation, when
defendant admitted that he followed victim from highway to her apart-
ment building and intended to have sex with her, victim resisted and fled,
defendant chased victim to bottom of steps inside apartment building and
shot her two times; (6) trial court's finding that corpus delicti was
established when defendant confessed to police, when there was cor-
roborative evidence that victim's underpants had been removed, and
victim's underpants and shoes were discovered at the crime scene; and
(7) trial court's refusal to inform jury as to defendant's parole eligibility.
5 Wright, 245 Va. at 181-83,427 S.E.2d at 383-384.
6 Id. at 198-99, 427 S.E.2d at 393.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Juvenile Transfer in Capital Cases
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,7 the United States Supreme Court held
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of
fifteen year-olds. The Court held that "it would offend civilized stan-
dards of decency to execute a person who was less than sixteen years old
at the time of the offense." 8 In both Stanford v. Kentucky9 and Wilkins
v. Missouri,10 the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment does not
protect all sixteen or seventeen year-olds, as aclass, from being executed.
The Court acknowledged that some sixteen and seventeen year-olds
might be so protected, however.11  The issue is to determine what
procedures are required to insure that a particular juvenile is not in that
class in which execution would offend civilized standards of decency.
The states involved in Thompson, Stanford and Wilkins had juvenile
transfer procedures much more extensive than Virginia's to make that
determination. The Stanford court's decision permitted the execution of
juveniles only after they were given individualized consideration of their
moral culpability and maturity at a transfer hearing and at a capital
sentencing proceeding. In contrast, Virginia Code section 16.1-269(C)
requires only that the court consider the "nature of the offense" during the
transfer hearing. The issue is not settled as a matter of federal Eighth
Amendment law, and the statement by the Supreme Court of Virginia
that the penalty trial individualization applicable to all capital defendants
is sufficient is questionable. Defense counsel should raise objection to
the transfer hearing process and properly preserve the issues for appeal.
II. Mental Retardation
A provision of the juvenile transfer statute 12 requires a finding by
the court that the defendant is not mentally retarded or insane. The statute
stipulates that the defendant cannot be transferred to the circuit court
unless it is established, and the court finds, that the defendant is not
insane. A finding of no mental retardation or insanity may then be
appealed de novo in the circuit court. The court in Wright, by reference
to the standard for establishing insanity as a defense at trial,13 essentially
reversed the burden of proof regarding insanity in juvenile transfer
hearings. The court upheld Wright's transfer to circuit court on the basis
7 487 U.S. 815 (1987).
8 Id. at 830.
9 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
10 Id.
11 The court in Stanford, citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 194 (1982), stated that: "In
the realm of capital punishment in particular, 'individualized consider-
ation [is] a constitutional requirement', and one of the individualized
mitigating factors that sentencers must be permitted to consider is the
defendant's age.. .Moreover, the determinations required by juve-
nile transfer statutes to certify a juvenile for trial as an adult ensure
individualized consideration of the maturity and moral responsibil-
ity of sixteen and seventeen year-old offenders before they are even
held to stand trial as adults. The application of this particularized
system to the petitioners can bedeclared constitutionally inadequate only
if there is a consensus, not that seventeen or eighteen is the age at which
most persons, or even almost all persons, achieve sufficient maturity to
be held fully responsible for murder; but that seventeen or eighteen is the
age before which no one can reasonably be held fully responsible."
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375-376 (emphasis added).
12 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269(C) (1993).
of an absence of any proof that Wright was insane ormentally retarded. 14
The transfer report concluded that the defendant was not mentally
retarded. The intelligence tests showed that Wright was in the "border-
line range of intelligence," and "functions in at least the low average
level." 15 Dr. Arthur Centor, the clinical psychologist, gave his opinion
that the tests did not measure all aspects of Wright's intelligence, as
Wright possessed "street smarts."'16 However, the conclusion that
"street smarts" indicated the absence of retardation was professionally
incorrect and in fact may be an indication of just the opposite. Experts
on mental retardation have found that it is:
not surprising when a mentally retarded person brags about
how tough he is or how he outsmarted his victim, when he
accomplished neither feat. Overrating is probably closely tied
to desperate attempts to reject the stigma of retardation. Many
mentally retarded individuals expend considerable energy at-
tempting to avoid this stigma. In a similar vein, some mentally
retarded people make ill-advised and damaging attempts to
enhance their status or deny their disability in the courtroom. 
17
Thus, at the first indication that the defendant possesses a low I.Q. or is
"slow," defense counsel should seek appointment of a qualified expert
to examine for evidence of mental retardation.
III. Commonwealth Experts and 3:118
Wright indicates several errors and probable errors (it is unclear
from the opinion) in the application of Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.3:1, regarding expert assistance at the sentencing phase relative to
mental condition. It is essential that defense counsel be familiar with
what the statute does and does not authorize in order to employ it properly
in defense and assess the alternatives to its use. Errors and probable
errors suggested in Wright include limitation of exam scope and limita-
tion of testimony.
Dr. Centor's authority for his initial examination of the defendant
is unclear, but the opinion suggests that it was to conduct competency/
sanity examinations under Virginia Code sections 19.2-169.1 and 19.2-
169.5,19 as well as to act as the Commonwealth's reciprocal expert under
section 19.2-264.3:1(F) 20 Authority for the examination granted by
Virginia Code sections 19.2-169.1 and 19.2-169.5 does not encompass
examination for future dangerousness.
Dr. Centor's testimony on future dangerousness is also question-
13 Wright, 245 Va. at 183-84,427 S.E.2d at 384 (citing Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 208 Va. 316, 322, 157 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1967)).
14 Wright, 245 Va. at 181-82, 427 S.E.2d at 384.
15 Id. at 195,427 S.E.2d at 385.
16 Id at 184, 427 S.E.2d at 385.
17 Ellis and Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants,
53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 430 (1985).
18 In a given case, seeking appointment of an expert underAke v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), instead of under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.3:1, and consideration of ways to limit or block the Commonwealth
expert may be appropriate. Please contact the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse for further information on these alternatives.
19 Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1(A) also authorizes compe-
tency and sanity evaluations, but only to be performed by the defense
expert.
20 "Dr. Arthur Centor, a clinical psychologist in forensic psychol-
ogy, examined Wright to determine his competence to stand trial and his
competence at the time of the alleged offenses. The doctor also examined
Wright to ascertain factors in mitigation and in aggravation in the event
Wright was found guilty of capital murder." Wright, 245 Va. at 195,427
S.E.2d at 391.
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able if it was based on the reciprocal examination authorized by 3:1(F).
Unlike Stewart v. Commonwealth,2 1 the opinion does not contain an
assertion by Dr. Centor that he did not base his opinion in part on
statements made to him by Wright or on evidence derived from such
statements. 22 If Dr. Centor's testimony was based on Wright's state-
21 245 Va. 222,427 S.E.2d 394 (1993). In Stewart, the trial court
accepted Dr. Centor's assertion that he did not base his opinions about
future dangerousness on any statements made by Stewart during the
examination, even though Dr. Centor claimed that he based his opinion
on Stewart's prior criminal record, and the results of Stewart's psycho-
logical tests. Id. at 244, 427 S.E.2d at 408. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the trial court's finding. The Supreme Court of
Virginia also held that when a Commonwealth expert is allowed to
examine the defendant, the Commonwealth expert can examine for
future dangerousness as well. Id. at 243,427 S.E.2d at407-408. See also
ments or on evidence derived from them, he was only entitled to testify
in rebuttal of the defense expert, Dr. Samenow. 23 This he obviously did
not do, since Dr. Samenow offered no opinion on future dangerousness.
Summary and analysis by:
Mari Karen Simmons
case summary of Stewart, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
22 Indeed, an examination for competency to stand trial or for
insanity would be difficult to conduct without statements from the
defendant.
23 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(G) ("[N]o evidence derived
from any such statements or disclosures may be introduced against the
defendant at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial for the purpose
of proving the aggravating circumstances specified in § 19.2-264.4.
Such statements or disclosures shall be admissible in rebuttal only when
relevant to issues in mitigation raised by the defense.").
BEAVERS v. COMMONWEALTH
245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d 411 (1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Late in the night on May 1, 1990, nineteen-year-old Thomas
Beavers broke into the house of his neighbor, Marguerite Lowery, a
sixty-year-old widow who lived alone. Beavers raped her, and when she
started to scream, he held a pillow over her face, killing her. Before
leaving, Beavers took four of her rings from a dresser. On the morning
of May 2, 1990, an officer found Mrs. Lowery's body. Slightly more
than a year later, the Lowery murder remained unsolved. On May 14,
1991, Beavers broke into the empty house of his fifty-year-old next door
neighbor, Shirley Hodges. When she returned home, Beavers covered
her mouth with his hand, ordered her to be quiet, stripped off her clothes
and raped her. After Beavers left, she reported the rape to the police, and
told them that Beavers had used some of her white medical gauze tape to
bandage his hand that he had cut while breaking into her house. The
police searched Beavers's house for the gauze, but instead found Mrs.
Lowery's rings. Beavers confessed to both the rape of Shirley Hodges
and the rape and killing of Mrs. Lowery.
During voir dire, the trial court refused defense counsel's requested
question as to the opinion of the jurors regarding the death penalty: "Do
you believe that if one is convicted of taking another's life, the proper
penalty is loss of your own life?"I However, the trial court did ask each
juror, "[i]fthejury should convict the defendant of capital murder, would
1 Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 277, 427 S.E.2d 411,
418 (1993).
2 Id. at278,427 S.E.2dat418.
3 Id. at 285, 427 S.E.2d at 423.
4 Beavers assigned a number of other errors. Some of these the
Supreme Court of Virginia rejected in brief, conclusive language. Others
lid not involve death penalty law. On still others, the rulings provide
tittle if any guidance because they apply broad, settled principles of law
:o facts that are specific to the case being reviewed. Issues in these
-ategories that will not be discussed are: (1) trial court's refusal to allow
lefense counsel more peremptory strikes during jury selection; (2)
you be able to consider voting for a sentence less than death?"'2 Those
jurors who did not answer in the affirmative were questioned individu-
ally. After the jury had been selected, sworn and given preliminary
instructions, defense counsel moved to dismiss the jury, but the motion
was denied.
During the guilt phase, the Commonwealth's attorney's opening
statement contained five references to the jury's "recommendations"
about the defendant's penalty. Defense counsel objected at the end of the
entire statement. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion for a
mistrial, concluding that counsel had defaulted by waiting too long to
make an objection.
At the close of the evidence at the sentencing hearing, the trial court
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove vileness. The jury was
instructed that it would have to find future dangerousness before the
death sentence could be imposed. The jury found future dangerousness
and sentenced Beavers to death.
HOLDING
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affinmed Beaver's
conviction and death sentence. 3 The court held, inter alia,4 that the trial
court did not err in refusing defendant's proposed jury instruction to
ensure that the jurors would consider a sentence of life imprisonment
rejection of defense counsel's claims that Virginia's capital death statute,
§§ 19.2-264.2 through 19.2-264.5, violates the Fifth, Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments; (3) Commonwealth's refusal to provide defense
counsel with the names of all witnesses it intended to call at both the guilt
and sentencing phases of the trial; (4) refusal of the trial court to suppress
defendant's confession on the basis that the detective did not bring
defendant to a magistrate without unnecessary delay; (5) trial court's
admission of rings into evidence when search warrant stated that police
were to look for white medical gauze tape; and (6) judge's refusing to
grant a mistrial, but instead instructing the jury to disregard a police
officer's testimony concerning premeditation, when officer was reading
from a report that had not been admitted into evidence.
